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AHEAD OF HIS TIME: CARDOZO AND THE CURRENT 
DEBATES ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Alberto Bernabe* 
INTRODUCTION  
It is not an exaggeration to affirm that Benjamin Cardozo is one 
of the most influential judges in American history.1  He is certainly one 
of the most cited.2  In fact, it has been said that students of the law 
could organize their whole life, philosophically, morally and 
imaginatively, by saturating themselves with the work of a few great 
jurists, including Cardozo.3 Cardozo achieved fame, among other 
 
*Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. The author would like to thank Professor 
Samuel Levine and the Jewish Law Institute at Touro College Law Center for the invitation to 
participate in the Conference “Benjamin Cardozo: Judge, Justice, Scholar” and The John 
Marshall Law School for its support in the preparation of this article. 
1 Richard Friedman, On Cardozo and Reputation: Legendary Judge, Underrated Justice, 
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1932 (1991) (describing Cardozo as “one of our greatest judicial 
icons” and stating that “Cardozo’s was one of the greatest short tenures on the [Supreme] 
Court.”); Bernard Shientag, The Opinions and Writings of Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, 30 
COLUM. L. REV. 597 (1930) (Benjamin N. Cardozo is “the name most commonly identified 
with legal scholarship and with the liberal and scientific development of the law in America.”). 
On the other hand, see RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO, A STUDY IN REPUTATION vii (1990) 
(“Although the legal establishment canonized Cardozo during his lifetime and he is still widely 
considered not merely one of the greatest judges of all time but a judicial saint, there is 
considerable, perhaps an increasing, undercurrent of dubiety.”). 
2 In his book CARDOZO, A STUDY IN REPUTATION, Richard Posner discusses his attempt to 
measure Cardozo’s reputation and influence by quantifying information about Cardozo’s 
citations. Although he admits that the evidence is not conclusive, he states that “it tends to 
confirm the high repute in which . . . Cardozo is held.” POSNER, supra note 1, at 91. Among 
other things, Posner’s review of the evidence led him to conclude that Cardozo’s opinions for 
the New York Court of Appeals are cited substantially more often and have more staying 
power than those of his colleagues. POSNER, supra note 1, at 82-83. Commenting on Posner’s 
book, Richard Friedman wrote that “[a] detailed citation study was not necessary to 
demonstrate that Cardozo is well known.” Friedman, supra note 1, at 1928. 
3 JOHN POWYS, THE MEANING OF CULTURE 67, cited in Bernard Shientag, supra note 1, at 
597.  
1
Bernabe: Cardozo and Professional Responsibility
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
64 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
reasons, because of his professionalism and his aptitude for careful 
legal analysis.4 As his biographer Andrew Kaufman states, he “lived 
for the law, and the law made him famous.”5  And, of course, that fame 
is mostly due to his influential opinions. 
Much has been written about his famous opinions related to 
torts and contracts,6 so I want to emphasize a different aspect of his 
jurisprudence: his opinions on the practice of law; or more specifically, 
the opinions in which he had the opportunity to evaluate the conduct 
of lawyers within the practice of law and the role of the profession in 
regulating that practice. I want to talk about Cardozo’s views on the 
practice of law itself, on the concept of professionalism and on the 
relation between those views and contemporary debates related to 
professional responsibility. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF PROFESSIONALISM 
The concept of professionalism is usually found at the center 
of debates on whether the legal profession is adequately meeting its 
public purpose and following its core values and ideals.7  Yet, although 
it is understood that it provides the underlying basis upon which the 
legal profession’s regulatory system is built,8 it is interesting that there 
 
4 John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1474 (1999) (Cardozo 
was a great jurist because he self-consciously combined astute lawyerly analysis with a 
sensitivity to social conditions and social norms); Shientag, supra note 1, at 598 (Cardozo’s 
opinions “bear the marks of careful preparation, of patient and laborious research, of a 
profound understanding of legal principles interpreted in the light of their past history and their 
present ethical, social, and economic setting.”); Andrew Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo as a 
Pardigmatic Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 281, 282 (1999) (“Cardozo considered the 
difficult legal issues at the intersection of his method of philosophy, emphasizing logical 
reasoning, and his method of sociology, emphasizing public policy, on an ad hoc basis that 
focused on the reasons for particular rules in the context of the facts of each case.”); See also 
Robert Keeton, Andrew Kaufman’s Benjamin Cardozo as a Paradigmatic Tort Lawmaker, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1999). 
5 ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 3 (1998). 
6 Id. at 416 (Cardozo was best known for his torts and contracts opinions). 
7 Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 PROF. LAWYER 4 (2008).  
8 As explained by Professor Neil Hamilton, “[t]he concept of “professionalism,” separated 
from any type of argument that an earlier golden-age existed when ethics were better . . . 
describes the important elements of an ethical professional identity into which the profession 
should socialize both law students and practicing lawyers. This approach to professionalism 
connects the public purpose, core values, and ideals of the profession with the goal of fostering 
an ethical professional identity within each lawyer.”  Id. at 3. 
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is no consensus on how to define the concept of professionalism.9   
Sometimes the term is used as a synonym of civility.10  Sometimes it 
is used as an antonym of engaging in a business.11  Sometimes it is 
used to refer to a higher social calling.12 Taking these and other 
elements often used to define a profession, however, different scholars 
have developed broad views on the meaning of the concept.  For 
example, it has been argued that professionalism encompasses “the 
important elements of an ethical professional identity into which the 
profession should socialize both law students and practicing lawyers”13  
and that a professional is someone engaged 
 
9 Thomas Morgan, The Fall and Rise of Professionalism, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 451 (1985) 
(professionalism is not a self-defining term); Neil Hamilton, supra note 7, at 5 (“Although 
professionalism is a highly useful term to describe the important elements of an ethical 
professional identity, legal scholarship currently does not provide a clear definition of the 
term.”); American Bar Association, In the Spirit of Public Service, A Blueprint for the 
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, REPORT OF THE A.B.A. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM 
10 (1986) (professionalism is an elastic concept the meaning and application of which are hard 
to pin down); Fred Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1303, 1307 (1995) (professionalism is an abused term); Timothy Terrell & 
James Wildman, Rethinking Professionalism, 41 EMORY L. J. 403, 406 (1992) (professionalism 
is an elusive concept); Burnele V. Powell, Lawyer Professionalism as Ordinary Morality, 35 
S. TEXAS L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1994) (the concept of professionalism is little-defined); Deborah 
Rhode, Opening Remarks: Professionalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 458, 459 (2001) (central part of 
the “professionalism problem” is lack of consensus about what exactly the problem is). See 
also Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1993); Richard C. 
Baldwin, Rethinking “Professionalism” and Then Living It!, 41 EMORY L. J. 433 (1992); Susan 
Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of 
Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney 
Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547 (1998); John C. Buchanan, The Demise of 
Legal Professionalism: Accepting Responsibility and Implementing Change, 28 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 563 (1994); Robert L. Nelson, Professionalism from a Social Science Perspective, S.C. 
L. REV. 473 (2001). 
10 Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar 
Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657 (1994). 
11 Morgan, supra note 9; Thomas Morgan, Inverted Thinking about Law as a Profession or 
Business, THE JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 115, 116-18 (2016) (“There are 
probably an inexhaustible number of ways to contrast what it means to be in a profession with 
what it means to run a business.”). 
12 Hamilton, supra note 7, at 4 (arguing that because the early debates on professionalism 
were sidetracked, professionalism “for many lawyers has meant the bench and bar’s response 
to a perceived loss of both civility and a sense of calling in the profession.”). See also, Michael 
Ariens, The Rise and Fall of Social Trustee Professionalism, THE JOURNAL OF THE 
PROFESSIONAL 49 (2016).  Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical 
Relationship of Professionalism to Effectiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 137 (2011); Neil Hamilton, Assessing Professionalism: Measuring Progress in the 
Formation of an Ethical Professional Identity, 5 U. ST. THOMAS  L . J. 470   (2008). 
13 Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, supra note 7, at 4. 
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in roles that require education substantially beyond that 
of most citizens, involve personal judgment that most 
who deal with them are not in a position to evaluate, 
and work that is so important to public health or 
personal freedom that their . . . clients need special 
assurance of the professional’s integrity and 
reliability.14 
As it relates to lawyering, this “special assurance” needed for the 
protection of the public is provided in the form of regulation and a 
comprehensive system of disciplinary enforcement of that regulation.15  
In fact, it can be said that professionalism provides the basis for the 
profession’s rules of ethics, or, in other words, that the rules are an 
expression of the principles of professionalism.16  And, one of the most 
important of these principles is the fact that lawyers owe fiduciary 
duties to their clients. 
As with other subjects, on this topic Cardozo was ahead of his 
time.17  His views on professionalism and on the regulation of the 
profession already reflected this modern approach. 
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY AS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE 
Much of the law of professional responsibility is derived from, 
or related to, the principle that lawyers are fiduciaries of their clients.18   
As such, lawyers owe their clients a duty to act with utmost good faith, 
candor and honesty, to protect their clients’ confidential information 
and to always favor their clients’ interests over those of others or of 
their own.19   Cardozo understood this principle because his approach 
 
14 Morgan, Inverted Thinking, supra note 11, at 116. 
15 Morgan, Inverted Thinking, supra note 11, at 115, 117, citing JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE 
LAW: BUSINESS OF PROFESSION (1916), for the proposition that self-regulation is an inherent 
element to professional status. See also RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN DZIENKOWSKI, 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A STUDENT’S GUIDE 33 (2012-13) (One cannot discuss the 
regulation of law without recognizing that it is a “profession”). 
16 See Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, supra note 7, at 12-13. 
17 Interestingly, according to his biographer, Cardozo was lionized in his day as a 
“progressive judge” who used his role as a judge to modernize legal doctrines. Andrew 
Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo as a Paradigmatic Tort Lawmaker, supra note 4, at 282. 
18 ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI,  supra  note 15, at 42. 
19 ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 42. As explained by Professor Neil 
Hamilton, “[a] lawyer owes a client the fiduciary duties of safeguarding confidences and 
property, avoiding impermissible conflicts of interest, dealing honestly with the client, 
adequately informing the client, following the instructions of the client, and not employing 
4
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in deciding cases was influenced greatly by his experience as a 
lawyer,20 and it is quite possible that Cardozo’s own practicing 
lawyer’s perspective influenced, if not determined, the outcome of at 
least some cases.21 
In Moller v Pickard,22 for example, Cardozo wrote an opinion 
that exemplifies his view on this subject.  In that case, a group of 
minority shareholders in a business entity sued the entity’s lawyer 
because the lawyer had bought shares in the entity when the entity was 
failing.23  The plaintiffs argued the attorney had taken advantage of the 
situation and betrayed their trust and his duty to the client.24   In a short 
opinion finding in favor of the attorney-defendant, Cardozo explained 
that attorneys have a duty to make sure business transactions with 
clients are “fair and open,”25 and that attorneys have a duty to make 
full disclosure to the clients, and to retain nothing without their 
knowledge and approval.26  Applying these principles to the facts of 
the case, Cardozo found that the attorney did not violate his fiduciary 
duty, concluding the case was “not one of selfish or malign endeavor 
on the part of an attorney to gain title for himself to the injury of a 
client.”27  Rather it was an example of a case in which the attorney 
conducted himself according to his duty and acted in response to the 
client’s request “with the fullest understanding and approval of every 
detail of the transaction.”28 
Cardozo’s opinion in Moller is short and direct, providing 
essentially just the conclusion of the analysis rather than an 
explanation of the analysis that resulted in that conclusion.  At the time, 
this was Cardozo’s usual practice. He limited statements of principle 
 
adversely to the client powers arising from the attorney-client relationship. This body of law 
calls on the lawyer to restrain self-interest similar to what the law of fiduciary duty requires of 
other agents in fiduciary relationships.” Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, supra 
note 7, at 12. 
20 Andrew Kaufman, Response to Robert E. Keeton and Gary T. Schwartz, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 319 (1999). 
21 Id.; see also KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 416 (fiduciary duty was a key element 
in Cardozo’s decisions in both corporate law and the law governing lawyers); Goldberg, supra 
note 4, at 1474 (Cardozo conceived of himself as a participant in the practice of law; he 
maintained the “internal point of view” of the legal practitioner). 
22 232 N.Y. 271 (N.Y. App. 1922). 
23 Id. at 273.  
24 Id. at 274.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Moller, 232 N.Y. at 275. 
28 Id. at 275.  
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to the particular factual setting of the case at hand.29  However, a few 
years later he departed from this practice when he authored his most 
famous opinion on the subject of fiduciary duties: his decision in 
Meinhard v. Salmon.30 
Meinhard involved an alleged usurpation of a business 
opportunity by a member of a joint venture.31 In this case, the plaintiff 
and the defendant had agreed to a joint venture to lease, renovate and 
operate a hotel. Toward the end of the duration of the lease, the 
defendant negotiated a new deal with the owner of the property, which 
resulted in a new lease, without informing the plaintiff.32  The plaintiff 
then sued, claiming the defendant had deprived him of participating in 
the new venture and demanded his share of the interest in the new 
agreement.33  After the plaintiff prevailed in the lower courts, Cardozo 
wrote the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment 
based on his understanding of the principles of fiduciary duties: 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workday     
world . . . are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary 
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but . . . 
an honor the most sensitive, is the standard of 
behavior. . . . Only thus has the level of conduct for 
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden 
by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by a 
judgment of this court.34 
Cardozo did not base his conclusion on precedent cases but on 
his interpretation of a general principle that suggested a duty of 
undivided loyalty as the basis of a fiduciary relationship. And in 
deciding the case this way, Cardozo was ahead of his time.  Even 
though the defendant had not violated an explicit rule at the time, 
Cardozo’s opinion essentially stood for the proposition that the rules 
 
29 KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 239. 
30 249 N.Y. 458 (N.Y. App. 1928). 
31 Id. at 458-59. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.   
34 Id. at 464. Interestingly, just as they had done in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248 
N.Y. 339 (N.Y. 1928), Cardozo wrote the majority opinion and Judge Andrews wrote a 
dissenting opinion. Andrews agreed on the principles related to fiduciary duties but disagreed 
on Cardozo’s interpretation of the facts of the case. For Andrews, the new lease was not an 
extension of the original joint venture, but a new and different business transaction because it 
involved more properties and many new terms and conditions. Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 473. 
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ought to be different going forward.  For this reason, it has been said 
that the opinion showed “prophetic insight” and that “no judge has ever 
come up with a better formula for stating the fiduciary’s duty.35 
This principle of a “high fiduciary duty,” which was the 
culmination of Cardozo’s efforts to implant a sense of honorable 
conduct,36 is what formed the basis of Cardozo’s opinions on the 
practice of law.37   In In the Matter of Rouss,38  for example, Cardozo 
emphasized that “membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with 
conditions”39 including maintaining fitness of character that advances 
the dignity of the profession.  Likewise, in Andrewes v. Hass,40 a case 
in which a lawyer sued his own client, Cardozo criticized the lawyer 
for wanting to favor his own interest in a profit over the client’s right 
to terminate the representation.41   For Cardozo, the notion that a 
lawyer could behave in such a way would betray “the function of the 
legal profession and of its duty to society.”42 
III.  REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION  
Cardozo’s principle of a “high fiduciary duty” also formed the 
basis of the American Bar Association’s efforts to draft and 
promulgate a code of legal ethics43 and, therefore, of Cardozo’s 
understanding of the notion of, and the need for, regulation of the 
profession.  He understood that the fiduciary duty owed by lawyers had 
to be regulated, that violations of the regulation had to be strictly 
 
35 KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 241 (citing Russell Niles, Contemporary View of 
Liability for Breach of Trust, 29 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, 574, 575-76, and POSNER, supra note 1, at 104-05. 
36 KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 241, 242. (Cardozo emphasized personal obligation 
which meant honorable conduct in fiduciary roles). 
37 KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 425 (Cardozo “was uncompromising in his pursuit 
of responsible behavior and a clean image for the profession.”). 
38 221 N.Y. 81 (1917). 
39 Id. at 84. 
40 214 N.Y. 255 (1915).  
41 Id. at 258 (“The employment of a lawyer to serve for a contingent fee does not make it 
the client’s duty to continue the lawsuit and thus increase the lawyer’s profit.”). 
42 Id. at 258-59. 
43 James M. Altman, Considering the ABA’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2395 (2003) (Underlying the ABA’s efforts was the idea that it is possible to articulate and 
maintain a level of lawyer conduct that is something higher, something better, than the 
minimal normative standards imposed by the criminal law or, what Benjamin Cardozo called 
twenty years later, the “morals of the market place”) (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 
545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)). 
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enforced and that violations of the regulation should have 
consequences. 
In addition, if Cardozo’s approach to proper ethical conduct 
was based on regulation without specific rules of professional conduct, 
there still would have to be a mechanism, or authority, for the 
implementation of the regulation. It would be odd to recognize a need 
for implementation and imposition of consequences if there was no 
agency with the authority to do so. Yet, for Cardozo this was a 
straightforward issue. Clearly, it was the courts which had direct 
authority over the regulation of the profession. 
An early example of Cardozo’s approach to the notion of 
regulation of the profession can be found in In the Matter of Rouss.44   
In that case, writing for a unanimous court, Cardozo found that the 
state had the authority to disbar a lawyer for having confessed to 
misconduct even though the testimony was offered under statutory 
immunity protection.45   He reasoned that the immunity provided by a 
state statute did not apply to the authority of the courts to regulate the 
profession: 
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with 
conditions. A fair private and professional character is 
one of them. Compliance with that condition is 
essential at the moment of admission; but it is equally 
essential afterwards. . . . Whenever the condition is 
broken, the privilege is lost. To refuse admission to an 
unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past 
offenses. The examination into character, like the 
examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness. To 
strike the unworthy lawyer from the roll is not to add to 
the pains and penalties of crime. The examination into 
character is renewed; and the test of fitness is no longer 
satisfied.46 
A decade later, in People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin,47 Cardozo 
expanded on his view on the regulation of the practice of the profession 
finding that courts had the authority to compel testimony, and to 
impose penalties for contempt on those who refused to testify, as part 
 
44 221 N.Y. 81 (1917). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 84-85. 
47 248 N.Y. 465 (1928). 
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of an investigation into generalized misconduct within the 
profession.48  Based on his interpretation of English law and the state 
Constitutions, and citing Rouss for the proposition that “[m]embership 
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,” Cardozo concluded 
that attorneys had a professional duty to cooperate with the courts in 
order to protect the honor of the profession.49  More importantly, he 
specifically held that there was “little room for doubt” that attorneys 
might be regulated by rules and orders of the courts, including the 
authority to compel testimony as part of an investigation into 
misconduct.50  Thus, in Rouss, Cardozo subordinated the individual 
rights of an attorney to the standards of the profession, and in Culkin 
he placed the authority to administer those standards in the courts. 
IV.  THE CURRENT DEBATES ON PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY  
Grounded on this framework, during his tenure in the New 
York Court of Appeals, Cardozo participated in a number of cases that 
addressed issues regarding the practice of law that we are still debating 
today, including the difficulty of defining what constitutes “the 
practice of law,” and, for that reason, the limits of statutes banning the 
unauthorized practice of law. As explained by Cardozo’s biographer 
Andrew Kaufman, “Cardozo attempted to translate his views about the 
professional obligations of attorneys to their clients into a broad right 
of lawyers and the public to protection from competition by persons 
and organizations who were not lawyers and hence were not similarly 
regulated.”51  That concern is similar to the current debate over whether 
entities like Quicken Loans or LegalZoom are engaged in the practice 
of law,52  and over whether it would be a good idea to allow non-
lawyers to provide some legal services.53 
 
48 Id. at 479-80.  
49 Id. at 470-71. 
50 Id. at 477. 
51 KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 427. 
52 For a discussion of some of the issues related to this topic see, among others, Alberto 
Bernabe, Justice Gap vs. Core Values: The Common Themes in the Innovation Debate, 41 
THE JOURNAL OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (2016); Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of 
Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 49, 58 (2015); Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified 
Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLORIDA L. REV. 977 (2003); Raymond H. Brescia, 
Uber for Lawyers: The Transformative Potential of a Sharing Economy Approach to the 
Delivery of Legal Services, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 745 (2016). 
53 See supra note 52.  
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Cardozo would probably not have been a fan of Quicken Loans 
or LegalZoom.  Actually, to say that is unfair. Cardozo probably would 
not have liked Quicken Loans and LegalZoom in the 1920s or 1930s, 
but a lot has changed since then, and it is impossible to know whether 
Cardozo’s views would have changed over time.  For that reason, 
ironically, the most interesting aspect of Cardozo’s opinions is not how 
they show that things have changed but how they seem to have 
remained the same.  The fact is the legal profession is still debating 
some of the same issues today. 
Compare, for example, People v Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,54 
decided in 1919 and Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,55 decided by the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina in July 2017. In People v Title 
Guarantee & Trust Co., Cardozo wrote a short dissenting opinion in a 
case involving facts that raised similar questions as those raised by the 
debate regarding Quicken Loans and LegalZoom. The case involved a 
corporation in the business of guaranteeing bonds, mortgages and titles 
to real estate charged with a violation of a statute that banned 
corporations from holding themselves out to the public as being 
entitled to practice law, or to render legal services.56  The Court of 
Appeals reversed the conviction, but Cardozo dissented.57 
The question presented by the case, and still debated today, 
relates to the definition of the practice of law.58  At what point does the 
provision of legal forms, or even legal advice, become the practice of 
law?  In his concurring opinion, Judge Pound addressed the question 
as follows: 
Doubtless many individuals, unlearned in the law, 
occasionally draw deeds, wills, mortgages and other 
instruments without rendering legal services in the 
common acceptance of the term who would be startled 
to learn that they had criminally engaged in the practice 
of law. The test of the legislative intent is to be found, 
however, in the present day evil which the legislation 
aims to correct. The evil addressed seems to be, both in 
the case of the individual and the corporation, the 
practice of rendering, with some continuity, services of 
 
54 227 N.Y. 366 (1919). 
55 Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 803 S.E.2d 707 (S.C. 2017). 
56 Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. at 369.  
57 Id. at 381. 
58 See generally People v Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366 (1919). 
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/9
2018    CARDOZO AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 73 
the character now generally performed by lawyers as a 
part of their ordinary routine. . . . The legislation is in 
aid of the lawyers, and for the protection of the public, 
and is antagonistic to the policy which would permit 
any one to act habitually as a scrivener or 
conveyancer. . . . This does not imply that a real estate 
broker may not prepare leases, mortgages and deeds, or 
that an installment house may not prepare conditional 
bills of sale, in connection with the business and as a 
part thereof. The preparation of the legal papers may be 
ancillary to the daily business of the actor or it may be 
the business itself. The emphasis may be upon the 
services of the broker or the business of the trader or it 
may be upon the practice of law.59 
In other words, for Judge Pound the key is whether providing 
legal services is the main business of the entity in question, or whether 
it is simply a part of, or ancillary to, the main business.  Cardozo agreed 
with this approach to the issue, but reached a different conclusion when 
applied to the facts of the case. Pound concluded that the corporation 
did not make it a business to prepare legal forms “for all who apply, 
independently of its chartered powers.”60   In other words, he did not 
think the corporation was in the business of providing and filling out 
legal documents; it was in a business that incidentally required it to 
help its customers fill out the documents. As he concluded, the 
corporation “does not hold itself out as preparing legal instruments 
generally but only in connection with its legitimate business.”61  
Cardozo disagreed. He opined that the conviction should have been 
affirmed because filling out legal forms should be considered to be 
practicing law.62 
It is fascinating that this debate is essentially the same we are 
still having as part of the discussion of the modern concept of 
“innovation” and the new contours of the legal marketplace.63  Take, 
for example, the recent decision in Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 
decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in July 2017, the facts 
 
59 Id. at 378-79. 
60 Id. at 380. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 381; see also KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 427. 
63 See supra note 52. 
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of which are eerily similar to those of People v Title Guarantee & Trust 
Co. and which perfectly illustrates the point. 
In Boone, a group of homeowners filed a request for a 
declaratory judgment arguing that Quicken Loans, a nationwide online 
mortgage lender, was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in 
South Carolina when refinancing the homeowners’ mortgage loans.64   
In deciding that Quicken Loans was not engaged in the practice of law, 
the court reiterated its position that “it is neither practicable nor wise 
to attempt a comprehensive definition [of the practice of law] by way 
of a set of rules.”65   The court explained it is preferable “to decide 
what is and what is not the unauthorized practice of law in the context 
of an actual case or controversy rather than through an abstract set of 
guidelines,”66 keeping in mind that the policy of prohibiting laymen 
from practicing law exists for the purpose of protecting the public by 
preventing the intrusion of incompetent and unlearned persons in the 
practice of law, rather than for the purpose of creating a monopoly in 
the legal profession, a proposition for which it cited a precedent from 
1939.67 
Although it is difficult to point to a specific moment when the 
debate regarding “innovation” began, it is safe to say that LegalZoom’s 
“do it yourself” approach to legal services had something to do with it. 
Although LegalZoom provides access to services that might otherwise 
be unavailable to many people, its new approach to the provision of 
legal services was not necessarily well received. Just like the 
corporation involved in People v Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 
LegalZoom faced opposition from the bar and the courts in many 
states.68   At the end of 2009, LegalZoom was sued in Missouri for 
engaging in unauthorized practice of law.69  Also, in November 2010, 
 
64 Boone, 803 S.E.2d at 455.  
65 Id. at 461 (quoting In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124-25 
(S.C. 1992)). The court also pointed out that other jurisdictions have adopted the same 
approach. Id. at 460 n.6 (citing In re Shoe Mfrs. Protective Ass’n, 3 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Mass. 
1936)) (reaffirmed by Real Estate Bar Ass’n for Massachusetts, Inc. v. Nat’l Real Estate Info. 
Servs., 946 N.E.2d 665, 674 (Mass. 2011)). 
66 Id. at 461 (quoting In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124–25 
(1992).  
67 Boone, at 459-60, (citing State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 5 S.E.2d 181, 186 (S.C. 1939)). 
68 See Gene Quinn, LegalZoom Continues Unauthorized Practice of Law, IPWATCHDOG, 
February 3, 2009 available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/02/03/legalzoom-continues-
unauthorized-practice-of-law/id=1899/. 
69 Nathan Koppel, Class Action Claims Online Legal Forms Pose Threat To Consumers, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL BLOG, (July 27, 2011), available at https://blogs.wsj.com/law 
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the Pennsylvania Bar issued an opinion concluding that many online 
legal document preparation services, including many of the services 
provided by LegalZoom, constituted the unauthorized practice of 
law.70  Then, perhaps tired of being on the defensive, in 2011, 
LegalZoom sued the North Carolina Bar challenging its application of 
the rules regarding unauthorized practice.71 
Over time, LegalZoom’s battles helped the discussion evolve 
from a debate on finding ways to practice law more efficiently to a 
debate on finding different ways in which to provide legal services, 
including debates as to who should be allowed to practice law to begin 
with. In other words, the discussion of innovation in the practice of law 
has become a discussion about the regulation of the practice of law.72  
The title of a Canadian document on the subject provides a great 
illustration of this point. The document is titled “Innovative 
Regulation.” In it, the Bar Associations of three Canadian provinces 
discuss possible new regulatory approaches in light of changes in the 
 
/2011/07/27/class-action-claims-online-legal-forms-pose-threat-toconsumers/?mod=WSJBlog;  
Gene Quinn, LegalZoom Sued in Class Action for Unauthorized Law Practice, IPWATCHDOG, 
(Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/02/09/legalzoom-sued-in-    
class-action-for-unauthorized-law-practice/id=8816/. That claim eventually settled. Alberto 
Bernabe, Legal Zoom settles claim of unathorized practice of law, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY BLOG, August 23, 2011, available at http://bernabepr.blogspot.com/2011/ 
08/legal-zoom-settles-claim-of-unathorized.html. 
70 Penn. Bar Assoc., Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee Formal Op. 2010-01 (Mar. 
10, 2010), available at http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/unautpra/Opinions/2010-
01LglDocument Preparation.pdf 
71 Nathan Koppel, LegalZoom Sues North Carolina Bar, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL LAW 
BLOG, (Oct. 7, 2011), available at https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/10/07/legalzoom-sues-
north-carolina-bar/?mod=WSJBlog. Eventually, the parties agreed to suspend the litigation to 
give the state legislature a chance to amend the definition of the practice of law. The 
amendment was approved in 2015 to redefine the term “practice of law” by exempting          
services that provide blank legal documents. See Alberto Bernabe, Legal Zoom                                   
Settles Case vs North Carolina Bar, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BLOG, (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://bernabepr.blogspot.com/2015/10/legal-zoom-settles-case-vs-north.html. 
72 The amendment to the North Carolina rules which redefined the practice of law in order 
to allow LegalZoom to conduct business in the state also imposed new regulation on the 
company. For example, anyone seeking to provide the types of services at issue must register 
with the State Bar every year, and each type of document must be reviewed and approved by 
a licensed North Carolina attorney before it is available online. The services also must include 
a disclaimer that the online documents are not a substitute for seeking legal advice, and any 
customer satisfaction disputes must be referred to the State Bar. See Alberto Bernabe, Legal 
Zoom Settles Case vs North Carolina Bar, PROFESSIONAL  RESPONSIBILITY  BLOG, (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://bernabepr.blogspot.com/2015/10/legal-zoom-settles-case-vs-north.html. For a good 
discussion of some of the issues involved on whether LegalZoom should be regulated                              
by the legal profession see the discussion of some members of the Legal Ethics                                   
Forum blog at Legal Zoom Redux, LEGAL ETHICS FORUM, (May 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2014/05/legal-zoom-redux.html. 
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practice of the profession, including the controversial notion of 
alternative business structures which allow attorneys to partner with 
non-attorneys to provide legal services.73  Likewise, Washington State, 
for example, has approved regulation to administer a program that 
allows non-lawyer professionals to be certified to provide certain 
services previously provided by lawyers in divorce cases.74  Other 
states have, or are working toward establishing, similar programs.75 
Yet, as stated above, these new developments are controversial 
and the debate continues, mostly dominated by two distinct themes: 
the “Justice Gap” and the “Core Values” themes.76  The Justice Gap 
theme focuses on the need to develop ways to improve the way the 
profession serves the legal needs of people who need them.77  The Core 
Values theme focuses on the need to oppose some types of innovation 
because of the need to protect principles upon which the practice of the 
profession is based.78  How these themes are addressed by regulatory 
agencies in the near future will determine the fate of the discussion on 
innovation in the practice of law in the United States. 
If all of this sounds familiar to fans of Cardozo’s opinions it is 
because, again, the underlying themes within that debate79 can be 
 
73 See Innovative Regulation, A Collaboration of the Prairie Law Societies, (Nov. 2015), 
available at http://www.lawsociety.sk.ca/media/127107/ INNOVATINGREGULATION.pdf.                                              
See also Barbra Bailey, Innovating Regulation, LEGAL SOURCERY, December 21, 2015, 
https://lsslib.wordpress.com/2015/12/21/innovating-regulation. 
74 Thea Jennings, An Access to Justice First: Washington State’s Limited Licensing 
Program for Nonlawyers, @Law, Fall 2014 at 28, 29. Elizabeth Chambliss, Law School 
Training for Licensed “Legal Technicians”? Implications for the Consumer Market, 65 S.C. 
L. REV. 579, 580 (2014); Robert Ambrogi, UnAuthorized Practice, ABA JOURNAL, Jan. 2015, 
at 72, 74. 
75 Commissions in California and Oregon have proposed programs similar to the one in 
Washington.  See Chambliss, supra note 74, at 590. The report of the California commission 
is available at http://board.calbar.ca.gov/ docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem1000013003. 
pdf. The report of the Oregon commission is available at http://bog11.homestead.com/ 
LegalTechTF/Jan2015/Report_22Jan2015.pdf. Vermont and New York have created 
commissions to study the issue.  Chambliss,    supra note 74, at 592; Ambrogi, supra note 74, 
at 78.  For a good discussion of the benefits of a program of non-lawyer legal services see 
Perlman, supra note 52, in which he argues that Washington State’s  LLLT program is creating 
a new, and likely lower cost, option for consumers by allowing appropriately trained and 
regulated professionals to engage in some kinds of law practice without a law degree. Perlman 
concludes that “[i]n the end, the LLLT program serves the public interest and advances the 
regulatory objectives that should form the core of the law of legal services.”  Perlman, supra 
note 52, at 112. 
76 See Bernabe, supra note 52. 
77 See supra note 52. 
78 Bernabe, supra note 52. 
79 For a discussion of these themes, see Bernabe, supra note 52. 
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/9
2018    CARDOZO AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 77 
found in them. For Cardozo, the main theme relates to the need to 
preserve, or protect, the core values of the profession. For those who 
promote innovation and access to legal services, the main theme relates 
to the need to close the “justice gap” in our society.80   The continuing 
debate over the definition of the practice of law, and of who can 
provide legal services, is just one example of the consequences of 
efforts to modify the legal marketplace in order to confront the justice 
gap. 
Just like some current authors do, Cardozo would probably 
argue that the trend in innovation based on technology enabled 
delivery of legal services in an effort to make the practice of law less 
expensive and more efficient reduces what used to be a profession 
focusing on providing services to clients to the sale of a commodity to 
consumers.81  This “commoditization” of the profession, which some 
 
80 The phrase “justice gap” is often used in reference to the fact that even though there are 
enough lawyers available, the legal needs of most Americans are not being met. This reality 
has created a demand for programs that provide access to solutions to legal issues, which in 
turn has resulted in calls for more “innovation” in the way in which legal services are provided. 
Selina Thomas, Rethinking Unauthorized Practice of Law in Light of the Access to                           
Justice Crisis, 23 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1, 3 (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/professional_lawyer/2015/volume-23-number-3/rethinking_unauthorized_ 
practice_law_light_the_access_justice_crisis.html (referring to the “daunting justice gap” and 
pointing out that 80 to 85 percent of the US population who is need of civil legal services is 
underserved); Ambrogi, supra note 74 at 72, 74 (Multiple state and federal studies show that 
80 to 90 percent of low and moderate income Americans with legal problems are unable to 
obtain or afford legal representation.). Thea Jennings, supra note 74, at 28, 29 (discussing a 
study by the Supreme Court of Washington which found that 88% of people of lower means 
attempted to resolve their legal issues without legal representation); Milan Markovic, Juking 
Access to Justice to Deregulate the Legal Market, 29 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 63, 65 (2016); 
American Bar Association Commission on the Future of Legal Services, Issues Paper 
Concerning New Categories of Legal Service Providers, October 16, 2015, at 2 (Numerous 
studies over many decades reveal that cost is a significant impediment to accessing legal 
services for most low and moderate income Americans, especially when they face significant 
civil legal problems.). See Ronald C. Minkoff, Access to Justice and a New Definition of 
Professionalism, N.Y. LEGAL ETHICS REPORTER, (Sep. 1, 2015) available at http:// 
www.newyorklegalethics.com/access-to-justice-and-a-new-definition-of-professionalism; 
ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, Report on the Future of Legal Services in 
the United States 5, 10-18 (2016), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/images/abanews/2016FLSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf (finding that despite sustained efforts 
to expand the public’s access to legal services, significant unmet needs persist). 
81 See Lisa H. Nicholson, Access to Justice Requires Access to Attorneys: Restrictions on 
the Practice of Law Serve a Societal Purpose, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761 (2014) (unauthorized 
practice of law restrictions are necessary to preserve the “core  values”  of  the legal 
profession—i.e., that clients  should  receive  ethically  competent  legal  services  from their 
attorneys, including the requirement that attorneys are independent and loyal, maintain client 
confidences, and eschew conflicts of interest. These core values are what consumers of legal 
services have come to expect, whether they retain an attorney or purchase legal services from 
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trace to the business models of companies like LegalZoom,82  can be 
seen as compromising the profession’s core value of owing a fiduciary 
duty to clients and as a threat to the duties owed to clients.  According 
to this view, commoditization is the result of an effort to cut costs, and 
cutting costs can lead to cutting corners at the expense of fiduciary 
duties to clients.83 
These themes are the same regardless of the prevailing debates 
within the profession, including whether American jurisdictions 
should allow lawyers to partner with non-lawyers or to share fees with 
non-lawyers, or whether non-lawyers should be allowed to provide 
limited legal services, or whether lawyers should be allowed to 
practice law anywhere in the country regardless of where they passed 
the bar exam.84 
Facing these issues, Cardozo might have reached different 
conclusions in his day than we might be heading for today, but he 
clearly would have approached the questions from what we can 
consider a current or contemporary view. He understood then what we 
are arguing now. In the end, the question that needs to be addressed is 
the same question that needs to be addressed when considering any 
changes to the regulation of the profession:  Will the change benefit 
clients and prospective clients in need of access to legal services? Yet, 
for now at least, the debates continue. 
V. LOOKING AHEAD TO THE FUTURE  
In 2014, the American Bar Association created a Commission 
on the Future of Legal Services and charged it with the task of 
recommending innovations that would improve the delivery of, and the 
public’s access to, legal services in the United States.85 Unfortunately, 
the Commission’s work was quickly affected by the prevalent debate 
 
non-attorney providers. These core values are also what have continually maintained our 
civil society). 
82 See, for example, Raymond Brescia, What We Know and Need to Know About Disruptive 
Innovation, 67 S.C. L. REV. 203, 212 (2016). 
83 Id. 
84 For a good discussion of the contemporary debates on many of these issues, see supra 
note 52. 
85 The Commission’s final report is available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/images/abanews/2016FLSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf.  Alberto Bernabe, ABA Commission on 
Future of Legal Services issues its final report; I am not particularly impressed, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY BLOG, (Aug. 11, 2016), available at http://bernabepr.blogspot.com/2016/08/ 
aba-commission-on-future-of-legal.html. 
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on the justice gap and core values. Eventually, and perhaps not 
surprisingly, while the ABA encouraged jurisdictions to explore 
innovative changes, its initiatives seem to be limited by what Cardozo 
would argue is the need to protect the profession’s core values. For that 
reason, ironically, the end result is that in an effort to open the doors, 
or “liberalize,” the delivery of legal services, the likely result will be 
more regulation.86 
The fact the debates have not been settled yet is not necessarily 
a bad thing, though. In fact, there is a movement afoot that encourages 
jurisdictions to adopt specific “regulatory objectives” based on the 
premise that “without knowing the underlying objectives of lawyer 
regulation, one cannot meaningfully measure whether the regulation 
succeeds, or is overbroad, too lenient, or too restrictive.”87  And, 
Cardozo would be happy with the objectives that have been 
recommended which include: protection of clients, protection of the 
public interest, promoting public understanding of the legal system and 
respect for the rule of law, supporting the rule of law and ensuring 
lawyer independence sufficient to allow for a robust rule-of-law 
culture, increasing access to justice, promoting lawyers’ compliance 
with professional principles, and ensuring that lawyer regulation is 
consistent with principles of “good regulation.”88  Not only do these 
reflect the values of the profession that Cardozo emphasized in his 
opinions, they are also based on the notion that the regulation of the 
profession should be administered by the profession itself. 
This, however, opens the door to another current concern 
within the profession: if the legal profession’s regulators do not adopt 
regulatory objectives, someone else may do so for them (and the results 
may be less satisfactory).89  And this brings the discussion full circle 
back to People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, in which Cardozo explained 
the importance of placing the authority to regulate the legal profession 
on the profession itself.  As he eloquently put it, the profession’s power 
to regulate itself “will make for the health and honor of the profession 
and for the protection of the public. If the house is to be cleaned, it is 
 
86 For a very good discussion on what that new approach to regulation might, and perhaps 
should, look like see Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional 
Regulation, 55 FLORIDA L. REV. 977 (2003). 
87 Laurel Terry, Why Your Jurisdiction Should Consider Jumping on the Regulatory 
Objectives Bandwagon, 22 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1 (2013). 
88 Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the 
Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2734-42 (2012). 
89 Terry, Why Your Jurisdiction, supra note 87, at 8. 
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for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers, to do the 
noisome work.”90  In other words, as explained in Kaufman’s 
biography of Cardozo:  
Cardozo cared greatly about the honor of the profession 
and the role of judges as traditional guardians of that 
honor. If the judiciary was to exert control over the 
profession, it needed to punish violation of its rules; 
otherwise ‘strangers,’ that is, the legislature or an 
administrative board, would end up doing the task.91 
Interestingly, given that the more things change, the more they 
stay the same, eighty-nine years later, the same concern is receiving a 
lot of attention. In June, 2017, one of the main speakers at the ABA 
National Conference on Professional Responsibility raised that exact 
same concern when discussing the alarming picture of how much state 
rules vary on what constitutes practicing law in a jurisdiction in 
violation of rules regarding unauthorized practice.92  Accepting the 
2017 Michael Franck Professional Responsibility Award, Robert 
Creamer warned that the legal profession “needs to come up with 
uniform ethics rules or else Congress may act on its own to regulate 
lawyers.”93 He argued that if the changes are done to us rather than by 
us, the result will not likely be something with which we will be 
happy.94 
It is striking how this debate sounds so familiar when reviewing 
Cardozo’s approach to the concept of professionalism. As explained 
by Professor Neil Hamilton, one of the defining characteristics of a 
profession is that society recognizes the profession’s autonomy to 
regulate itself, “expecting the profession’s members to control entry 
into and continued membership in the profession, to set standards for 
how individual professionals perform their work so that it serves the 
public good in the area of the profession’s responsibility, and to foster 
 
90 People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 481 (1928). 
91 KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 429. 
92 Joan Rogers, Lawyers Urged to Fix ‘Crazy Quilt’ of State Ethics Rules, 33 ABA/BNA 
LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 336 (2017) (discussing speech by Robert Creamer, the 2017 
Michael Franck Professional Responsibility Award winner); Robert A. Creamer, Ethics Rules 
Uniformity: “The Vision Thing,” 24 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER NO. 3. 
93 Id.  In fact, a proposal for Congress to adopt a statute that mandates mutual recognition 
of rights of practice by lawyers across state borders has already been suggested. See James 
Jones, Anthony Davis, Simon Chester and Caroline Hart, Reforming Lawyer Mobility – 
Protecting Turf or Serving Clients?, 30 GEO. J. OF L. ETHICS 125, 189 (2017). 
94 Id. 
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the core values and ideals of the profession,”95 all of which is 
consistent with Cardozo’s expressed views in People ex rel. Karlin v. 
Culkin.96 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Benjamin Cardozo’s opinions on the legal profession reflect 
the modern debate on innovation and the future of the legal profession 
and the two modern themes upon which that debate is based. He 
understood the notion of the profession as a calling that owed duties to 
society in general, but he also emphasized the need to preserve the 
“honor” of the profession through a strict understanding of the 
fiduciary duty owed to clients. 
Much of the debate regarding innovation revolves around the 
question of whether the current professional regulatory framework 
should be redesigned in order to allow new ways to provide legal 
services including the delivery of legal services across state borders 
and in association with, or even by, non-lawyers. Yet, although the 
seeds of the debate can already be detected in some of Cardozo’s 
opinions, the discussion does not seem to be ready for resolution. 
While the ABA’s Commission on the Future of the Legal Profession 
has taken steps to open the door to innovative approaches to the 
delivery of legal services, even considering allowing alternative 
business structures97 and non-lawyer service providers,98 the ABA 
itself continues to avoid embracing some of those approaches.99 
While the ABA is encouraging jurisdictions to specifically 
address the innovative changes that seem to be disrupting the legal 
 
95 Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, supra note 7, at 4-5; see also ROTUNDA AND 
DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 34. 
96 248 N.Y. 465, 481 (1928). 
97 ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services, Issues Paper Concerning Alternative 
Business Structures, 1 (April 8, 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
images/office_president/alternative_business_issu es_paper.pdf (“The Commission believes 
that any consideration of possible regulatory reforms should include an examination of 
Alternative Business Structures (ABS).”). 
98 Id. 
99 Bernabe, supra note 52. The institutional reaction of the ABA is not new. Morgan, 
Inverted Thinking, supra note 11, at 121, (even though a 1986 ABA Commission on 
Professionalism report concluded that resistance to allowing non-lawyers to provide some 
form of legal services “for selfish reasons only brings discredit on the profession, at the ABA 
House of Delegates, core values of the legal profession have dominated professionalism 
rhetoric.”).  
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marketplace, its initiatives seem to be limited by what many argue is 
the need to protect the profession’s core values.100  For that reason, as 
stated above, ironically, the end result is that in an effort to open the 
doors, or “liberalize,” the delivery of legal services, regardless of how 
the ABA or individual states decide to address the surge of innovation, 
the likely result will be more regulation.101  Thus, how to balance, and 
regulate, professional values against the need to meet the legal needs 
of the public will continue to be the key to the debate about innovation 
in the practice of law. 
In the end, sadly, although Cardozo at times may have been 
ahead of his time, the passage of time does not seem to have resulted 
in a lot of change. In praising Cardozo, Professor Robert Keeton once 
wrote that “[w]e continue to celebrate a giant of another generation 
even after times and needs of the day have changed.”102 Yet, ironically 
it now seems that, at least in matters related to the regulation of the 
legal profession, we should continue to celebrate his work because 




100 Id. It has been argued that this type of limitation is a systemic problem within the 
American Bar Association. See James Moliterno, Ethics 20/20 Sucessfully Achieved its 
Mission: It “Protected, Preserved, and Mantained,” 47 AKRON L. REV. 149, 159 (2014) (the 
lesson is clear: ABA commissions that remain modest with proposals will pass through the 
House of Delegates’ gauntlet; ABA commissions that propose actual reform will fail.). 
101 See Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, supra note 52. 
102 Keeton, supra note 4, at 3. 
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